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Quarks, N e u t r i n o s , a n d Virtual Perfection:
I n t e r v i e w s w i t h R o b e r t W. G a l v i n a n d L e o n M . L e d e r m a n
T i m o t h y J. Gilfoyle

Editor's Note: In June 1995, the Chicago Historical Society bestowed its
first annual Making History Awards on a group ofChicagoans who have
made historic contributions to the city. The inaugural group included
Gwendolyn Brooks, John Hope Franklin, Robert W. Galvin, Leon Lederman, Judge Abraham Lincoln Marovitz, and Studs Terkel. Historian
Timothy Gilfoyle has been conducting interviews with each of the honorees
and, in the first of a series of articles, he explores the lives and careers of
businessman Robert W. Galvin, former chairman of Motorola, Inc., and
Professor Leon Lederman.
At first glance, Leon M. Lederman and Robert W. Galvin have
little in common. Lederman—a Nobel Prize-winning physicist,
raised in the Bronx by Russian immigrants, educated at Columbia
University—has devoted the entirety of his professional life to the
academy as a research scientist, laboratory director, and university
professor. Robert Galvin, in contrast, was born and bred in the
Midwest, the scion and heir-apparent of the founder of Motorola,
Inc. As a seven-year-old, Galvin accompanied his father to company meetings and business trips across the country. If anyone
ever was, Robert Galvin was "born" to be a corporate president.
A closer examination, however, uncovers common ground in
these seemingly disparate careers in science and industry. As
youths, for instance, both were born into devoted families of
modest means. Paul Galvin's later success in manufacturing was
not so apparent when his only child was born in 1922. "My father
and mother [Lillian Galvin] moved to a little town in Wisconsin
where I was born," remembers Robert Galvin. "In that community, he had gone to work with one of his boyhood acquaintances,
. . . but that company went bankrupt in the course of the early
months of my life in that little town. So my father and mother had
to motor pennilessly to an aunt and uncle on the South Side [of
Chicago], and that's where they kind of established our family,
and gradually he caught on to having a means of taking care of
my mother and myself."

Above: Paul Galvin holding his twoyear-old son Robert, 1924.
Below: Undated photograph of Paul
and Robert Galvin. As a youngster,
Robert often accompanied his father
on business trips.
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Galvin describes his father's entrepreneurial sensibility as
"almost genetic—he always knew he wanted to be in business."
When Paul Galvin's partner elected to restart the company in
Chicago, he joined him again. "And in not too many early years,
the man's company went bankrupt," recalls Galvin. "On this occasion, however, there was a . . . product line of that company that
had very inexpensive tools . . . . And my father acquired the tools
at auction, walked across the street, literally, with about a half a
dozen people, . . . and started a little company to make the battery
eliminators." So began Motorola.
Lederman endured few of the economic insecurities and early
failures that beset the Galvins. The Bronx, he remembers, "was a
great place. It was a good place to grow up. I had schools within a
few blocks of the house, a public school and a high school [were]
nearby. I had friends. We had a wonderful city [New York] we
could wander around in. There was no problem about traveling
around the city, going into the subway and trying to get lost and
coming out some unknown place and finding out it was a province
called Brooklyn. . . . The schools were excellent. The teachers
were very well educated and dedicated, and I remember many of
them as being stimulating, exciting. That was a wonderful time to
grow up."

Above left: Robert and Paul Galvin,
c. 1950. By 1956, the younger
Galvin was president of Motorola.
Above: Robert presented Motorola's
"Twenty-Five-Year Service Pin" to his
father on October 24, 1953.
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Robert Galvin was only six when, in 1928, his father founded the
Galvin Manufacturing Corporation at 847 West Harrison Street.
The market for battery eliminators, however, was quickly evaporating, as their main application for use in battery-operated home
radios became obsolete. So Paul Galvin moved the company into an
entirely new product line—the car radio. What was an unheard of
and high-risk innovation in 1930 soon became commonplace in the
expanding car culture sweeping the United States. The "first commercial auto radio" was the "Motorola," a name signifying both
motion and the radio. The Motorola's popularity convinced Paul
Galvin to rename the company after it in 1947.
After growing up in Rogers Park and Evanston, Robert Galvin
attended the University of Notre Dame for two years before joining
the Army Signal Corps in 1942. At the end of World War II,
he returned to his father's
company, working first as a
stock boy and eventually as a
production-line troubleshooter.
Galvin quickly advanced within
the ranks before being promoted to executive vice president in 1948 and president in
1956, only three years before
his father died.
When Robert Galvin assumed control, Motorola was a
$227-million-a-year company
manufacturing car radios,
walkie-talkies, solid-state color
televisions, and phonographs.
Over the ensuing three decades, he transformed Mo58

Above left: Father and son share
lunch in the Motorola cafeteria,
1954. Above: Robert Galvin with one
of his teammates on an Evanston softball team, 1957. Galvin played
second base.
Below: Paul and Robert Galvin discussing portable radio and chassis,
c. 1955.
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torola into an $ 11 -billion-a-year giant in electronics, employing
over one hundred thousand people. Like his father more than a
half-century earlier, Galvin completely abandoned several product
lines for others. By 1990, Motorola had jettisoned its television
business and was the leading manufacturer of two-way radios, cellular phones, pagers, and advanced dispatch systems for commercial fleets. It was the fourth-largest maker of semiconductors.
Unlike IBM, which faltered upon entering a new technological
phase (moving from mainframe computers to personal computers), Motorola nimbly moved from conventional two-way
radios and TVs to cellular radios and pagers.
Motorola's success generated political appointments
for Galvin. In 1970, he served on the President's Commission
for International Trade and Investment. From 1982 to 1985,
Galvin chaired the Industry
Policy Advisory Committee to
the U.S. Special Representative to the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. During that
time, Motorola attacked Japanese producers for "dumping" cellular phones in the
United States, a charge later
upheld by the International
Trade Commission. Galvin
was later credited as a key
architect in opening up the
Japanese semiconductor market in 1986.
In 1990, Galvin retired as
Motorola's chairman, but remains involved in long-term
corporate planning as the
head of Motorola's executive
committee. Since then, he has been inducted into the National
Business Hall of Fame and received the National Medal of Technology. Just prior to his retirement as chairman, Galvin was
named one of the first recipients of the Malcolm Baldridge
National Quality Award from the Department of Commerce
(1989), specifically for making products with zero imperfections.
Indeed, future historians will most likely equate Galvin's tenure
at Motorola with "virtual perfection." In 1978, after general sales
manager Art Sundry pointed out numerous poor features in
Motorola's product line, Galvin began emphasizing "total quality."
In his words, Motorola adopted "a culture of intending that we
never do anything that would dissatisfy the customer." Proponents
sometimes referred to this as the "six sigma" philosophy.
According to Galvin, "a sigma is a standard deviation from norm,
and in statistical quality control parlance, if you can . . . build . . .
a product or a service to where all the variations stay within six
standard deviations from norm and fit your specifications, you will

Carl Lindholm, Robert Galvin, and
Bo Yibo, Vice Chairman of the Central Advisory Committee of the
People's Republic of China, October
1986.
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In 1988, President Ronald Reagan
presented Galvin with the Malcolm
Baldridge National Quality Award
(below). Left: Galvin addresses the
U.S. Department of Commerce audience after the presentation.
have only 3.4 items outside the range of every million of something you do. This translates into, when you finally work the
system right, a quality level of 3.4 defects per million. And we call
that 'virtual perfection.'" Galvin admits that Motorola examined
the ideas of W. Edwards Deming and other postwar industrial
theorists, but in the end "we finally came up with . . . our own
system. We were just either screwy enough or different enough
[to] . . . let ourselves develop our own system."
Virtual perfection departed dramatically from the scientific
management techniques developed by Frederick Winslow Taylor
early in the twentieth century. According to Galvin, "the six sigma
systems . . . are quite different from the Taylor advocacy. . . . An
overly simplified way of characterizing the Taylor approach was
that it was a top-down phenomenon. If I measured your time, I
could figure out how to tell you how to use your time better, and I
would think of a system, and then I'd ask—I'd require—you to use
my system."
Whereas Taylorism broke down and measured factory floor
production to the individual worker, Motorola organized workers
into independent "self-directed teams." According to Galvin, the
teams "have no supervisor. Somewhere along the line there's
somebody in the building that has some authority, and they see
that person in terms of human interrelationships from time to
time, but they may never get an order from that person." In contrast to Taylor's system, which imposed management directives
on workers, Galvin asked: "Why don't we trust our people to
determine from the bottom up what needs to be done? Once
we've decided what needs to be done, we very often institutionalize that for a temporary period of time. . . . And we teach ourselves to follow that process so that we have a 'no mistakes'
methodology of getting a function done, but in the meantime
we're studying how to improve it, and the people who do the job
are figuring out the improvements."
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Galvin insists that virtual perfection not only rejected the principles of Taylorism, but actually saved immense amounts of time.
"We now know that if we perform a function perfectly, we do it
faster, or if we aim to do a function faster, we have to figure out
how to get rid of the parts that cause the mistakes or the delays
. . . and then we end up with better quality," claims Galvin. "You
can almost start from either end of that pole and come to a very
satisfactory result, but it depends on Mr. and Mrs. Everyman
being the authors of what happens versus Mr. Taylor's plan prescribing for the rest of us." Characteristically, there is not a single
time clock in any Motorola plant.
A major ingredient in Motorola's success and longevity has
been its ability to adapt to changing conditions in the American
economy. Consider the invention of the transistor in 1948,
remarks Galvin. "We didn't know that was coming in 1947. The
laser is a surprise. The computer is a surprise. In 1940, I didn't
know that there would be a computer. . . . Now, those things are
historical facts. They are events that took place, and they can be
aggregated under the rubric of a surprise. The consequence of
that is, that none of the companies that my father looked up to
when I started here as a stock boy in 1940, are in any of the businesses that we're in today. Historically, most institutions do not
adapt to the next surprises. That's a lesson about human beings. It
happens to be an historical fact of the last fifty years. I believe you
could find the same history the prior fifty years and the prior fifty
years. We did adapt. I think there's something special about that. I

Galvin visits employees on the
assembly line, 1959.
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Above: At the 1971 Chicago Public
Schools Math and Science Conference, Galvin talks with a student and
a school official. Left: Galvin testifies
before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
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think that we had an orientation to 'renewal,' and every time
something new happens, why can't we do it? It's a 'why not' versus
'why would anybody do that' or 'we're so satisfied.'"
While Galvin was searching for perfection in the workplace,
Leon Lederman was looking for the same in his laboratories. After
attending James Monroe High School, Lederman received his
bachelor of science degree from the City College of New York in
1943 and his Ph.D. in physics from Columbia University in 1951.
He spent the next twenty-eight years as a professor at Columbia,
simultaneously serving as director of Nevis Labs from 1962 to
1979 and occupying the Higgins Chair in Physics from 1972 to
1979. Lederman then moved to Chicago to assume the directorship of the Enrico Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) in Batavia, Illinois.
Lederman remains one of the most prolific and honored scientists of his generation, authoring more than two hundred publications on the properties and interactions of elementary particles. His
most noted discoveries include the neutral K-meson particle (1956)
and a new elementary particle called the "bottom quark" or "B
Quark" (1977). Lederman was even involved in research leading to
the invention of Doppler Radar. His numerous awards and honors
include fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation (1958-59),
the Ford Foundation (1958-59), the Ernest Kempton Adams Foundation (1961), and the National Science Foundation (1967), as well
as the National Medal of Science (1965), the Wolf Prize in Physics
(1982), the Enrico Fermi Award (1992), and the presidency of
American Association for the Advancement of Science (1991-93).
The capstone of Lederman's scientific career came in 1988
when he was awarded the Nobel Prize in physics for the discovery
of the muon neutrino while working in 1961 and 1962 at
Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island. Subatomic particles with essentially no mass, neutrinos pass effortlessly through
objects, including the earth. Although the existence of neutrinos
was suggested as early as 1931, Lederman was among the first to
produce and study the particles in a laboratory. The research led
to the use of neutrino beams to probe the structure of matter and
helped demonstrate that there were fundamental symmetries
among subatomic particles. In recent years, physicists have relied
on neutrinos to develop theories uniting some of the basic forces
of nature.
Upon assuming the directorship of Fermilab in 1979, Lederman
remembers that "my first task . . . was to build that machine." "That
machine" was the Tevatron—the world's first superconducting synchrotron and the most powerful particle accelerator. Sometimes
called an "atom smasher," Tevatron is a superconducting magnet
system contained within a 6.3 kilometer circular tunnel called the
"main ring." Unlike other accelerators, Tevatron had the capability
of "capturing" antiprotons in a storage ring. This allowed scientists
to "gradually build up the number of antiprotons and squeeze them
together—a very, very elaborate choreography of many rings and
many technologies," says Lederman.

Leon Lederman as a child.
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The Tevatron produced different kinds of antiprotons. Once
inserted into the main ring, they ran in opposite directions from
the protons. Circling each other in clockwise and counterclockwise directions, the protons and antiprotons were accelerated to high energy speeds. "Then you make head-on collisions," states Lederman. "A head-on collision is much more
violent than the standard collisions of a particle with something
at rest. In other words, if a Mack truck hits a Ping-Pong ball, not
much happens to the Ping-Pong ball; it just flies off, and nothing
much happens to the truck. But if two Mack trucks collide headon, then you get CB radios and horns and fenders . . . flying off
in all directions. And violent collisions are the things we want to
learn about, because they teach us more about physics."
The Tevatron quickly surpassed its major competitor, the
accelerator at CERN in Switzerland, playfully described by Lederman as "the laboratory we
love to hate." CERN had successfully experimented with
head-on collisions of antiprotons, "but the energy [at
CERN] was a lot lower,"
remembers Lederman. So in
the late 1980s, the Tevatron
and CERN programs were
competing to discover the
"top quark." "At that point,
the race was a draw," says
Lederman. "Neither laboratory had found the top, but
CERN had exhausted its possibilities, and Fermilab was
just getting started. Because
our energy was 2.5 times higher, . . . our possibilities were much
higher. And in fact, in 1994, the Fermilab group published the
first evidence for the top quark. In 1995 it was confirmed, so
now we have a top quark, also found at Fermilab."
By some measures, the Tevatron epitomizes the vigor and
vitality of American science in the Cold War era. Since 1991,
Tevatron has been the world's most powerful source of data on
elementary particles, "the workhorse of American physics and
the most powerful machine in the world, especially now that
we've lost the Superconducting Super Collider [in Texas],"
argues Lederman. The Tevatron confirmed many predictions of
the Standard Model, the central theory of elementary particles,
allowing investigators to explore a domain where "no human
eyeball has ever set foot," according to one mixed metaphor.
These specialized pursuits for "top quarks" and "virtual perfection" reverberated beyond the confines of Fermilab and Motorola.
Both proved critical to the emergence of metropolitan Chicago's
most significant "technoburbs" or "edge cities"—Naperville and
Schaumburg. Since 1945, the combination of retail shopping
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Above: The "two neutrino" experiment
team, c. 1961. Brookhaven National
Laboratory, New York. Opposite:
Leon Lederman as a graduate student, c. 1946, with a cloud chamber,
an apparatus used to see particles.
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malls, industrial parks, and
professional office centers on
the outskirts of cities—all
linked together by interstate
highways—have produced a
new form of suburbanization.
By 1994, for
example,
Schaumburg's 193,396 employees doubled the number
found in individual downtowns such as Atlanta and
Minneapolis. Furthermore,
Schaumburg had more eating
and drinking establishments
than Portland, more Asian
residents than lower Manhattan, and more professional corporations than downtown Houston. The construction of Motorola's
new, 325-acre international headquarters in the 1970s was fundamental to Schaumburg's growth.
Naperville, thirty miles west of Chicago's Loop and a short distance from Fermilab, more than doubled its population during
the 1980s, reaching 85,351. Established in 1831 (making it
DuPage County's oldest community), by 1990, Naperville's
employment base was supported by AT&T, Amoco, Dow Jones,
Nalco Chemical, and Northern Illinois Gas. Much of this is centered along the seventeen-mile stretch of the East-West Tollway
(Interstate 88; opened in 1958), sometimes called the Illinois
Research and Development Corridor. Argonne National Laboratory, an outgrowth of the Manhattan Project research at the University of Chicago during World War II, was established southeast
of Naperville in 1947 by the Atomic Energy Commission.
Fermilab, along with Bell Telephone Laboratories and the
Amoco Research Center, was a key ingredient to the economic
growth of the Naperville area after 1960. One hundred twentyfive proposals suggesting more than two hundred sites in forty-six
states lobbied for the first "truly national laboratory" in the 1960s.
Lederman notes that "the Chicago area proposal was considered
the best. And it had the usual things in it: nearby major airport;
people could get to it. . . . The climate was . . . satisfactory. The
area had . . . a well-trained workforce, with the possibility of the
existence of some local companies of high technology, . . . and the
state was very good at saying, 'We will acquire the land. We'll pick
up the land.' The land was very flat, and the geology was very
good, and so there was no problem in having the site . . . thirty or
forty feet underground."
In the end, Fermilab "just outweighed all the other proposals,"
argues Lederman. "It was taken seriously by the state and by a community that was very pro getting this machine there." Indeed, the
state and local communities donated approximately sixty-eight
hundred acres of land. Not surprisingly, when Fermilab opened, "it
almost doubled the money—federal money—spent in this area, . . .

On his sixtieth birthday, Professor
Lederman delivered the lecture
"Innerspace, Outerspace" at Fermilab. Opposite: King Charles XVI of
Sweden presents the Nobel Prize to
Lederman.
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and lots of little high-tech companies sprang up around Fermilab.
Certainly when I got there, we began a very close collaboration. We
were used to each other and . . . this acted as an attractive feature
for bringing government people in, because they could visit two labs
with one blow. And so I think that was very positive, certainly very
positive for the Chicago area, because some huge fraction, . . . 50,
60, 70 percent of the [federal] funds are spent locally, both for
salaries of people who live there and for local contractors and local
suppliers of various materials."
Fermilab, in fact, engaged in industrial production during Lederman's tenure. The Tevatron required over one thousand magnets, each twenty feet long. No manufacturer anywhere in the
world produced such a product. "So we needed a factory,"
remembers Lederman. "We didn't really know how to make magnets, so the factory was an assembly line. That's what a factory is.
And the assembly line would produce some terrible magnets, and
we'd try to find out why they were so terrible, and we'd find out
that we have to change this and that. We made the change in the
tooling of the assembly line, and we kept going this way, hoping
that at some point, a good magnet would be produced. And then
we'd have two things: one good magnet and a mass production
capability. . . . [W]hat fed the factory were materials from
industry—the wires, the cables, the clamps, the stainless steel
devices—all the things that were needed from industry, but we
decided that this factory had to have intimate control . . . of it."
When working at full capacity, the factory employed about two
hundred to three hundred workers. "And it produced the thousand magnets and probably another two hundred or three hundred other kinds of superconducting kinds of devices that were
needed for this thing. And most of the workers were people who
were moonlighting. They were housewives and taxi drivers and
off-duty policemen."
In the latter years of their careers, Galvin and Lederman
became strong advocates of new and innovative forms of education. Beginning with the Motorola Training and Education
Center, a corporate-training department that opened in 1981,
Galvin was one of the first to introduce continuous training programs for employees in his American factories. Along with
Motorola University and the Galvin Center for Continuing
Education (established in 1986), Motorola employed new
delivery technologies such as computer-based training, electronic publishing, satellite communications, and other interactive training systems to serve as both classroom training
facilities and electronic distribution points. The system enabled
Motorola employees to attend in-depth seminars without
leaving their work locations. Satellite-transmitted seminars soon
replaced business trips. By 1985, Motorola devoted more than
one million hours to training twenty-five thousand of its ninety
thousand employees worldwide, an investment of forty-four million dollars.
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Galvin envisioned Motorola University supplementing the
existing system of higher education. "We couldn't expect the general system to provide us with the particular things that we needed
to have. To the extent that we also need the general system, we go
out and use that. To the extent that we duplicate a little bit of what
the general system does, it's because it fits compatibly with all
these specialty things that we just have to have for ourselves. We
had to train every employee. We have to train currently, every
employee in the company, statistical quality-control principles.
Well, if we went to the professor at [a] university, he would have,
probably, a wonderful course in statistical quality control. We just
want these nine pieces of that course, and we want it in four days,
because that's what we need to be on one of these teams."
In 1986, Leon Lederman helped establish the Illinois Mathematics and Science Academy, one of the nation's first residential
secondary schools created specifically for gifted students in the sciences. "Kids hate to be different," Lederman recognizes, "and
very bright kids know they're different when they're in normal
schools, and they react to that differentness in many different
ways. But here, they're all the same. They're all . . . academically
gifted and work together and collaborate and . . . have excellent
teachers. While the building was a hand-me-down from the overbuilding of schools in the early '70s, it works, and it's a very
splendid school."

Below: Lederman created Fermilab's
Children's Center, a daycare facility
for employee use, in 1981. Here he
visits the center on his sixtieth
birthday.
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Lederman left Fermilab in 1989, first becoming the Frank E.
Sulzberger Professor at University of Chicago and later the
Pritzker Professor of Science at Illinois Institute of Technology
(IIT). During that time, he founded the Teachers Academy for
Mathematics and Science (TAMS) at IIT. TAMS had a goal of
enrolling the seventeen thousand math and science teachers in
Chicago's 550 public schools over a seven-year period for a sixteenweek intensive course introducing new and innovative ways of
teaching science and math. If successful, Lederman hoped to
duplicate the program in other U.S. cities.
TAMS, Lederman acknowledges, was an outgrowth of the
school reform movement of the late 1980s. In 1989, there was "a
lot of excitement about fixing the Chicago public schools. And
one of the issues that was raised at some of the many meetings I
attended was the fact that elementary teachers don't know how to
teach math and science. And so that gave rise to the notion that
we might try to help them as university people." With support
from the Council of Presidents of local universities, the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, and the state of
Illinois, TAMS sought to "retool" elementary education instructors teaching math and science. "[T]he vast majority," claims Lederman, "have no training in math and science, and too often
approach the subject with the same fear and loathing as anyone
else and transmit that to the kids, and that's terrible." Lederman
admits the program had a "rocky" start. By beginning on a large
scale, he believed, they hoped to quickly adapt to the demands to
improve science education in the entire city of Chicago, "because
we wanted to fix the whole city. This is the megalomania of the
physicist, perhaps. . . . The federal government's getting harder
and harder to count on, and so we're trying to switch over to state
and local sources of money. That's where we are at the moment."
Both Lederman and Galvin express frustration regarding the
failure of Congress to support ongoing, scientific research, specifically the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) in Texas.
Designed to be the world's largest and most sophisticated
machine in the history of experimental physics, construction of
the SSC began in the 1980s. But in 1993, fears of cost overruns
and federal deficits induced Congress to abruptly halt funding.
Virtually overnight, construction of the SSC stopped. Based upon
his experiences as an evaluator of the National Science Foundation and other scientific enterprises, Galvin simply describes it as
"a tragedy." Ultimately, "we will fail to learn on the early side
some surprising revelations that science would likely have provided us, and we don't know what they are. . . . Discoveries are discoveries, and there is so much about this creation that we don't yet
know. . . . But every four or five years we say, 'Wow! Wasn't that a
great discovery that we made. I guess we know everything.' And
then four years later we discover something else we were so surprised to learn. But people have their hearts in a different place.
. . . Someday we'll have another tool, and we'll finally discover
what might have been discovered in 1999 or 2002, and we'll dis70
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cover it in 2022 or 2032. Too
bad. A whole generation will
have lost whatever the social,
medical, economic benefits
that would have been."
For Lederman, the rejection of the SSC had a more
ominous meaning. "When it
happened in 1993, the message wasn't clear," he concedes. Admittedly, the federal
government needed "to rein
in the budget and to solve the
deficit. . . . But by now it's
1995, [and] we realize that
was the first shot in a war that
the government, but mostly
the new Congress [elected in 1994], is waging against science. I
think that science is now under tremendous stress across the
board. It's not only particle physics; it's all physics and chemistry
and biology."

Leon Lederman poses for the press on
October 19, 1988, the day the Nobel
Prize announcement was made.

According to Lederman, the long-term impact of this and
related congressional decisions has catastrophic implications.
"[W]e're damaging the future prospects of our children and grandchildren. No question about it. We have a certain capital of basic
knowledge that we're running through in applying this to industry
and technology. That's going to run out."
Ironically, these negative forbodings harken back to the educations of Lederman and Galvin alike. The former readily admits he
profited from free public schools from kindergarten through college and later with graduate school and postdoctoral fellowships.
"[A]t some point, . . . somebody made it easy for me. I had good
schools. Who did that? Somebody did that. I had plenty of money
to do my research. Who did that? How did that come about?
Somebody did that." In Lederman's mind, the older generation of
scientists are responsible for the next. Indeed, "at some point, you
have to take your turn and see if you can do that for others, and
I'll tell you, it's not easy," he admits. "I mean, those guys who did
it all for me must [not] have had it easy, because this is very hard."
Galvin even attributes the origins of virtual perfection to his
elementary education at St. Jerome's School in Rogers Park. "On
a given occasion, whatever the grade was—fourth, fifth, or sixth,
and I think the nun's name was Sister Mary Norberdette—the
assignment . . . was announced that on Friday there would be a
test on fractions to decimals, decimals to fractions. . . . And she
said there was only one grade acceptable, and that was 100 percent. Well, of course, we all went home to our parents and raised
Cain about that. . . . My recollection is about a third of the kids in
the class got a hundred, and the rest of them all survived. . . . But
the interesting thing about that [is] that here was a nun that was
generating a standard, a level of expectation of perfection. And
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. . . isn't it interesting that I was given the introduction to the right
standard in fourth, fifth, or sixth grade when this nun said,
'There's only one acceptable answer—100 percent.' And now,
finally, when I'm about fifty-five or sixty years of age, I've finally
come to the realization, it's doable and it better be done. And so
we set much higher standards in our [Motorola] corporation."
Both are distressed by the possibility that American society is
unwittingly abdicating its historic commitment to scientific excellence. Galvin criticizes "those who would act rashly with regard to
what funds are being allowed and afforded by the federal government, which for the most part, end up being applied in universities where the greatest research is done in our society." For
Galvin, the question is clear-cut: "Will there be enough research
being done in government laboratories? I am of the side that I
would err on the side of doing more, because I think science
finally seeds the next economic development."
Lederman passionately argues that American society is beleaguered by an educational crisis. "At the moment," he contends,
"the American public is not terribly interested in schools." Lederman concurs with recent education critics who contend that the
poor quality of public education has made the United States "a
nation at risk." He admits that "although there are a lot of nice
stories about successes here and there, the center of mass hasn't
moved very much." Equally ominous is the public's ignorance
about science. By one measure, 97 percent of the American public
is illiterate in science. Lederman reminds Americans that "illiteracy is a shame of nations," a catastrophe in the making. For science to remain a positive force in American society, "we've got to
raise that understanding so that we can preserve a democratic
process, and maybe send some wiser and more knowledgeable
people to Washington."

Above: Robert Galvin addresses the
audience after receiving the Marshall
Field History Maker Award at the
Chicago Historical Society.
Below: Professor Leon Lederman
accepts the Enrico Fermi History
Maker Award from R. Eden Martin,
Chicago Historical Society trustee.

FOR FURTHER READING

The most accessible sources on the ideas of Robert W. Galvin and Leon
M. Lederman are in Robert W. Galvin, The Idea ofIdeas (Schaumburg, Illinois: Motorola University Press, 1991); Kenneth R. Thompson, "A Conversation with Robert W. Galvin," Organizational Dynamics, 20 (Spring
1992); Leon M. Lederman, The God Particle: If the Universe is the Answer,
What is the Question (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993); Leon M. Lederman (with David N. Schramm), From Quarks to the Cosmos: Tools of Discovery (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1988); Leon M. Lederman, "The
Tevatron," Scientific American (March 1991), 48-55; Leon M. Lederman,
"Blackboard Bungle," The Sciences (Jan.-Feb. 1995), 16-20. Robert Galvin
and Leon Lederman await their biographers.
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